

## Message Text

SECRET

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 069011

NODIS

CHEROKEE; WH FOR PRESIDENT FROM VANCE

FOLLOWING REPEAT USDEL SECRETARY IN MOSCOW SECTO 3022 SENT  
ACTION SECSTATE 28 MAR 77

QUOTE S E C R E T SECTO 3022

NODIS CHEROKEE

PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT

DEPT FOR ACTING SECRETARY ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS), PFOR, UR

SUBJECT: SALT DISCUSSIONS

1. SECOND SESSION THIS EVENING WAS WITH GROMYKO AND HIS  
TEAM AND DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO SALT. IN EFFECT, WE BOTH  
EXCHANGED OUR POSITIONS TO ESTABLISH THEM ON THE RECORD.  
I PRESENTED OUR COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL, AS WELL AS THE  
DEFERRAL OPTION, AND GROMYKO WENT THROUGH THE DETAILS OF THEIR

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POSITION, WHICH REMAINS AS BEFORE WITH ONE TWIST ON MOBILE  
MISSILES.

2. GROMYKO BEGAN THE SESSION WITH SOME GENERAL REMARKS,  
INTENDED TO UNDERLINE THE POINT THAT THEY PROCEED FROM  
VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS  
IN THE LAST YEAR, BUT THEY WERE PREPARED TO COMPLETE THE WORK

ALREADY BEGUN AND SIGN A NEW AGREEMENT. THIS WAS POSSIBLE BECAUSE MUCH OF THE WORK HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE ON DISPUTED ISSUES. HE ADDED THAT IN THIS CASE THERE WOULD BE NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS. IN AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO OUR COMPREHENSIVE POSITION, HE EMPHASIZED THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD GO FORWARD WITHOUT NARROWING THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, OR TRYING TO BROADEN IT.

3. I THEN PRESENTED OUR COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL IN DETAIL EXPLAINING ALL THE PROVISIONS, AS WELL AS THE IMPACT ON EACH SIDE. I PREFACED THIS ACCOUNT WITH A SHORT STATEMENT STRESSING THAT YOU HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO SIGN THE BASIC VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT AND DEFER BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILES, BUT YOUR STRONG PREFERENCE WAS TO TAKE A NEW AND BOLD STEP THAT WOULD NOT ONLY REPRESENT PROGRESS IN REAL ARMS CONTROL, BUT ALSO STRENGTHEN STRATEGIC STABILITY AND REPRESENT A MAJOR POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENT IN PUTTING OUR RELATIONS ON A NEW FOUNDATION.

4. GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO THE PROPOSAL. HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD GIVE A FORMAL REPLY, BUT IN A LATER SESSION. IN EFFECT, HOWEVER, HE COMMENTED ON OUR POSITION BY ATTACKING THE IDEA OF EXCLUDING CRUISE MISSILES FROM AN AGREEMENT, WHICH HE ARGUED WOULD OPEN A NEW ARMS RACE, AND EVEN IF ONLY DEFERRED, HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT MEAN THE ISSUES WOULD BE EASIER TO SOLVE LATER.

5. AT THIS POINT, HE WENT THROUGH THE SOVIET POSITION  
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AS FOLLOWS: AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES WOULD ONLY BE PERMITTED ON HEAVY BOMBER AND EACH B-52 WOULD COUNT AS ONE MIRVED VEHICLE, WHILE THE B-1 WOULD COUNT AS THREE MIRV'ED VEHICLES AGAINST THE AGREED MIRV CEILING OF 1320. ALL OTHER CRUISE MISSILES, WHETHER SEA-BASED OR LAND-BASED, WOULD BE BANNED OVER 600 KM.

6. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD MADE PREVIOUS CONCESSION IN THEIR WILLINGNESS TO COUNT ANY MISSILE TESTED AS A MIRV, BUT HE REMINDED US THAT THIS WAS CONDITIONAL ON SOLUTION OF THE CRUISE MISSILE AND BACKFIRE PROBLEMS.

7. HE WENT ON AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT OUR DISTORTED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE BACKFIRE, BUT ENDED BY SAYING IT WAS NOT A STRATEGIC SYSTEM AND THE ENTIRE QUESTION SHOULD BE DONE AWAY WITH ONCE AND FOR ALL.

8. ON MOBILE MISSILES, HE REFERRED TO THEIR POSITION OF JULY 1975, TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WOULD AGREE TO BAN

ALL MOBILE AIR LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, MOBILE LAND BASED ICBM'S, AND SEA BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES, EXCEPT FOR THOSE SLBM'S DEPLOYED ON SUBMARINES. HE ADDED THAT SOVIETS WERE NOT DEPLOYING THE SS-16, AND WOULD NOT DO SO IF THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT TO BAN MOBILE ICBM'S. HE BRUSHED ASIDE THE PROBLEM OF THE SS-20, CLAIMING THAT IT WAS A MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE. ON THE QUESTION OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE SS-16 AND THE SS-20, HE SAID THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT ARISE IF THE SS-16 WERE BANNED.

9. HE MENTIONED NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER AS UNRESOLVED ISSUES, AND THEN BROUGHT UP FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS. HE SEEMED TO BE THREATENING TO RETURN TO THEIR OLD POSITION, SAYING THAT PERHAPS THEY WOULD HAVE TO REVIEW THE ENTIRE QUESTION.

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10. ON REDUCTIONS, HE SAID THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY AFTER SIGNING VLADIVOSTOK TO DISCUSS REDUCTIONS. THEY DID NOT RULE OUT REDUCTIONS EVEN BEFORE THE END OF THE VLADIVOSTOK PERIOD (1985), BUT WERE AGAINST REDUCTIONS FOR SAKE OF PUBLICITY.

11. HE MADE A SHORT PRESENTATION ON STRATEGIC STABILITY, NOTING THAT A DEFINITION OF STABILITY WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS, THE EXISTENCE OF OUR FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, AS WELL AS THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF OUR ALLIES AND OUR CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT. HE ENDED BY STRESSING THAT THESE FACTORS HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF OUR NEW PROPOSAL.

12. AFTER AN INTERMISSION, I RESPONDED TO HIS POINTS. ON THE QUESTION OF CRUISE MISSILES, I SAID I HAD REVIEWED THE RECORD AND TALKED WITH KISSINGER, AND CONCLUDED THAT THEY WERE NOT INCLUDED IN DOCUMENTS WE HAD, BUT THAT OUR NEW PROPOSAL TOOK THEM INTO ACCOUNT BY DEFINING RANGE LIMIT AT 2500 KM AND BANNING ALL ABOVE THAT RANGE, THEREBY BANNING INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES. AT THIS POINT I EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS AN EFFORT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEIR VIEWS, BUT THAT OUR NEW PROPOSAL WAS A SINGLE PACKAGE.

13. ON THE BACKFIRE BOMBER, I TOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THIS ISSUE WAS A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES. THE AIRCRAFT HAD A CONSIDERABLY GREATER RANGE THAN ANY OF OUR MEDIUM BOMBERS AND A GREATER PAYLOAD AS WELL. THUS, OUR TREATMENT OF THIS ISSUE IN OUR COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL WAS

AN EFFORT TO TAKE THEIR POSITON INTO ACCOUNT.

14. ON THE SS-20, I SAID THAT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS  
THAT SOME ASSURANCE WAS NECESSARY AGAINST UPGRADING  
THE MISSILE BY ADDING A THIRD STAGE AND THEREBY CON-  
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VERTING IT TO AN ICBM. I NOTED THE PROBLEM OF NON-  
CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER, AND ADDED THAT THE OTHER  
SECONDARY ISSUES STILL NOT RESOLVED INCLUDED MIRV VERIFICATION,  
ESTABLISHING A DATA BASE, AND BANNING DELIBERATE  
CONCEALMENT. I ENDED BY STATING OUR VIEW THAT REDUCTIONS  
DID NOT INFRINGE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL  
SECURITY BUT THAT TO RAISE FBS WOULD MEAN BRINGING  
UP THE SOVIET MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES,  
AS WELL AS THE WHOLE RANGE OF THEIR SYSTEMS TARGETTED  
AGAINST EUROPE.

15. GROMYKO CONCLUDED THE SESSION BY GOING OVER  
QUESTION OF WHETHER CRUISE MISSILES WERE INCLUDED  
IN VLADIVOSTOK, AND I RESPONDED BY SAYING WE HAD A  
DIFFERENCE OF VIEW.

16. THIS SESSION SEEMED INTENDED TO PUT POSITIONS  
ON THE RECORD, AND TO ALLOW US TO EXPLAIN OUR NEW  
PROPOSALS, WHICH THEY MORE-OR-LESS HAD ANTICIPATED.  
IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT, BUT  
GROMYKO WAS NOT ACRIMONIOUS, AND WAS CAREFUL NOT TO  
REJECT OUR POSITION. WE MEET AGAIN TOMORROW ON SALT,  
WHERE I ASSUME WE WILL HEAR MORE DETAILED ARGUMENTS  
FROM SOVIET SIDE. VANCE

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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